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I. INTRODUCTION
According to the State of Washington's Community Pro-
tection Act, an offender who has been "convicted of a sexually
violent offense"' and has served the corresponding sentence
may be subjected to a civil action in which a "court or jury"2
determines whether the offender is a "sexually violent
predator."3 If so, the offender is incarcerated until such time
as it is concluded, in a subsequent civil action, that the offender
is cured.4 We see this legislation as a distinct departure from
the principles of determinant sentencing that the legislature
embraced a decade ago.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 established presump-
tive sentences for each offense, calibrated according to the seri-
ousness of the crime and the criminal history of the offender.5
Probation and parole were also excluded by the 1981 legisla-
tion. The normative argument in favor of determinate sen-
tencing is that insofar as the punishment fits the crime, the
• Professor of Political Science, University of Washington.
•* Ph.D. candidates in Sociology, University of Washington.
1. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.02(1) (Supp. 1990-91).
2. Id. § 71.09.050.
3. Id. § 71.09.020(1).
4. The Community Protection Act consists of 14 separate parts; civil commitment
is covered in Part X. The Community Protection Act imposes tighter constraints on
sexual offenders by extending the category of sexual offense to such crimes as
residential burglary and arson that are deemed to be "sexually motivated" (Part VI),
by increasing the sentences for sexual offenses (Part VII and IX), and by notifying the
community of and by registering sexual offenders who have served their terms and
have been released (Parts I and IV, respectively).
5. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030-.460 (1989 & Supp. 1990, 1990-91). Sentences are
"presumptive" in that judges may depart from the specified range when they find
"substantial and compelling reasons" for an exceptional sentence. Id. § 9.94A.120. For
three crimes-murder in the first degree, assault in the first degree with intent to kill,
and rape in the first degree-no exceptions are permitted to the specified minimums.
Id. § 9.94A.120(4).
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criminal justice system will be affording offenders their just
deserts. Criminologically speaking, determinate sentencing
promises to contribute to deterrence by providing clear and
predictable penalties.
From this perspective, the sexual predator legislation
amounts to a reversion to indeterminacy. While the criminal
sentence, per se, is determinate, the civil commitment provi-
sions subject sexual offenders to an indefinite period of
incarceration.
What are the principles that guide this return to indeter-
minacy? Taken at face value, rehabilitation would seem to be
the goal of the civil commitment provisions that make avail-
able a treatment program to cure and reintegrate sexual
offenders. Of course, rehabilitation was unequivocally rejected
by determinate sentencing reformers, who considered it both
discriminatory and ineffective.6 An alternative interpretation
is that the sexual predator provisions lead in an incapacitative
direction-that is, they are designed to predict which offenders
are so dangerous that they must be more or less permanently
institutionalized to protect the society. Either way, the sexual
predator legislation amounts to a repudiation of desert based,
determinate sentencing based on the principle that sentencing
has to do with past rather than future crimes.7
How are we to account for this retreat from the principles
of determinate sentencing? The retreat may be viewed as an
isolated exception or as an indication of a shift in sentencing
philosophies. Regardless of which approach best describes the
retreat from determinate sentencing, our objective is to under-
stand the criminological assumptions and political forces that
drive the sexual predator legislation. This Article focuses on
the political process and, in particular, on the role of victim
advocacy. We also want to situate the sexual predator provi-
6. Greenberg and Humphries summarize the argument against rehabilitation as
follows:
[R]ehabilitation was not merely a laudable goal that scientific research had
unfortunately failed thus far to achieve, but something far more insidious-an
ideology that explained crime in highly individualistic terms and legitimated
the expansion of administrative powers used in practice to discriminate
against disadvantaged groups and to achieve covert organizational goals (such
as alleviating court backlogs and repressing political opposition).
David F. Greenberg & Drew Humphries, The Cooptation of Fixed Sentencing Reform,
26 CRIME & DELINQ. 206, 206-08 (1980).
7. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OF FUTURE CRIME: DESERVEDNESS AND
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS (1987).
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sions criminologically-that is, to understand the criminologi-
cal argument in favor of these provisions and to explore the
societal implications of moving sentencing in this direction.
Our preliminary inquiry leads us towards two propositions
that will be taken up in subsequent sections of this Article:
(1) The criminological literature does not provide any
grounds for dealing with sexual offenders, as such, in an
exceptional fashion. The evidence does not indicate that sex-
ual offenders are any more likely to recidivate than are
other offenders or, indeed, that they are readily distinguish-
able from other violent offenders. They do not seem to be
any more amenable to treatment programs. Nor do the data
reveal an increase in the incidence of sexual offenses that
might justify calls for exceptional measures.
(2) It seems to follow, therefore, that the explanation for
the Community Protection Act is political. Specifically, it
seems attributable to two highly publicized sexual assaults
and to the dedicated efforts of victim advocacy groups that
were spawned by these appalling crimes. The work of the
advocacy groups led to the appointment of The Governor's
Task Force on Community Protection and subsequently to
the Community Protection Act that was passed by the Legis-
lature without opposition.
Assuming that this preliminary analysis is correct, our
interest is in exploring at length how, why, and to what effect
victim advocacy groups were able to muster so much
influence.8
II. CRIMINOLOGY
Let us turn first to the criminological literature to see
whether it provides a justification for excepting violent sex
offenders from the general rule of presumptive sentencing.
Only if violent sex offenders, their criminal records, and/or
their treatment prognosis are different from other offenders
would special measures seem to be warranted. Although acts
of sexual violence may often be particularly horrifying, only if
the offenders that commit such acts can be reliably identified
8. This work is preliminary in the sense that we have not been able to gather all
of the quantitative data that we need nor have we been able to conduct interviews with
participants in the policy process. Accordingly, the "findings" offered here are
provisional and will serve as questions or propositions for follow-up research. The
results of this research were presented at the 1992 Meetings of the Law and Society
Association in Philadelphia, May 28-31, 1992.
1992]
812 University of Puget Sound Law Review
does it make legislative sense to designate them as a special
class.' As we detail below, our reading of the relevant litera-
ture suggests that sex offenders look a lot like other offenders,
whether judged by their criminal records or their amenability
to treatment. Given the blurred boundaries of the sex offender
category, it seems hard to defend the special treatment of sex
offenders either legally or criminologically.
The first point to be made is that sex offenders are no
more likely to recidivate than are other types of offenders.
Bureau of Justice Statistics cited by the Governor's Task Force
indicate that in 1989, about 42% of all released murders were
rearrested; 51.5% of all released rapists were rearrested; 48%
of all other released sex offenders were rearrested; and 66% of
all released robbers were rearrested.'" Within these violent
crime categories, rearrest rates are, thus, higher for robbery
than for any other category." If rearrest rates are used as the
standard for determining special treatment for violent offend-
ers, then robbery should be targeted as a more serious problem
than sex offenses.
Nor do the available data suggest that crimes of sexual vio-
lence are increasing at a faster rate than other types of crime.
A 1990 study examines delinquency rates among 1945 and 1958
birth cohorts so that changes in incidence and recidivism rates
over time can be compared. 12 Incidence rates were signifi-
cantly different for the second cohort; 1.6 times higher for
overall crime and 3 times higher for violent index rates. When
violent crimes are analyzed by offense type, however, the fol-
lowing cohort II to cohort I rate ratios are reported: "3:1 for
homicide, 1.7:1 for rape, 5:1 for robbery, and almost 2:1 for
aggravated assault and burglary."' 3 Thus, although all violent
crime categories have increased over time, rape rates have not
9. It might be argued that crimes of sexual violence have such devastating
consequences for victims and their families and friends that special treatment is
warranted. Perhaps so, but this legislation does not impose heavier penalties for
particularly objectionable crimes. Instead, it purports to target a class of offenders
that are largely indistinguishable from other offenders, and it does so in a necessarily
ambiguous fashion; thus, the legislation raises the serious, and apparently unavoidable,
specter of false positives and false negatives. See Norval Morris, Keynote Address, 15
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 517 (1992).
10. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON COMMUNITY PROTECTION, FINAL REPORT, IV-4
(1989).
11. Id.
12. PAUL E. TRACY ET AL., DELINQUENCY CAREERS IN TWO BIRTH COHORTS (1990).
13. Id. at 276.
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increased as much as the rates for homicide, robbery and
burglary.
Another problem with excepting sex offenders from the
determinate sentencing scheme is that they are a diverse group
not readily distinguishable from other criminals. Sex offend-
ers are often involved in other types of crimes, including vio-
lent, as well as nonviolent, nonsex crimes. Washington State
data for 1990 indicate that 25% of adults convicted of felony
sex offenses had prior criminal histories. 4 But note that 44%
of these offenses were nonviolent, nonsex offenses; 16% were
violent, nonsex offenses; and 44% were felony sex offenses.' 5
The data for juvenile sex felons in Washington are somewhat
different but present the same mixed picture.'6
Similarly, a national self-report longitudinal study of vio-
lent offending reveals that most juvenile offenders are not
pure sex offenders.' 7 Only 4% of the juveniles were involved
in multiple serious violent offenses. The researchers found
that for "most serious violent offenders, involvement in serious
violent behavior was short-lived (one year)"'" and "few serious
violent offenders specialize in serious violent offending."' 9
14. WASHINGTON STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, A STATISTICAL
SUMMARY OF ADULT FELONY SENTENCING 1989 (1990).
15. Id. at Chart 5.
16. 44% of committed juvenile sex felons had prior criminal histories. 49% were
nonviolent, nonsex offenses; 18% were violent, nonsex offenses; and 33% were felony
sex offenses. Id. at Chart 11.
17. Delbert S. Elliott et al., Self-Reported Violent Offending, 1 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 472, 493 (1986).
18. Id. at 506.
19. Id. More broadly, the insufficiency of simply labeling an individual as a sexual
predator is reflected in research that reports the demographic, motivational, and prior
criminality and heterogeneity of sex offenders. A study conducted on rapists and child
molesters suggests that these two types of sex offenders should be studied separately
in subsequent research. See David Tingle et al., Childhood and Adolescent
Characteristics of Pedophiles and Rapists, 9 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 103, 115-16
(1986). Although research establishes that both groups are demographically diverse,
the only research finding that is similar for both rapists and child molesters is that
one-third to one-half of the offenders experienced sexual abuse during childhood. In
general, rapists are characterized as having adolescent and childhood conflicts
involving aggressive behavior. No common characteristics among child molesters were
found except that the majority reported closeness to their mothers.
Similarly, with regard to sexual homicides, research indicates differences in the
motives of serial sexual and single sexual homicide offenders. A study conducted in
response to research on the role of violent fantasies in sexual homicides found that
86% of serial sexual homicide offenders were characterized as having violent fantasies
as compared to only 23% of single sexual homicide offenders. Robert Alan Prentky et
al., The Presumptive Role of Fantasy in Serial Sexual Homicide, 146 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 887, 890 (1989). The researchers speculate that serial sexual homicide
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This diversity has made it difficult for researchers to
develop causative theories about sex offending,2 ° thus raising
questions about the Task Force's assertion that "clinical predic-
tions about the likelihood of future dangerousness can be relia-
ble when based on empirical evidence and developed according
to rigorous standards."21 We read the literature as indicating
that such predictions are much more difficult. Given the varia-
tions among sexual offenders and the lack of explanations to
account for their behaviors, prediction would seem to be a
rather chancy enterprise.
The available research also raises questions about the
effectiveness of treatment programs that will be made avail-
able to sexual predators under the civil commitment provi-
sions. According to a review by Furby, Weinrott and
Blackshaw, 22 of forty-two treatment studies, clinical treatment
has not been demonstrated to reduce recidivism rates for sex
offender populations. They argue that claims to the contrary
are misleading; recidivism rates only appear lower for treated
groups than for untreated groups. Their essential point is that
criteria for admission to treatment programs are based on fac-
tors such as the sex offender's admission of responsibility for
his or her crime and stated desire to reform. Sex offenders
who meet these criteria would probably have lower recidivism
rates than offenders who do not meet admissions criterion
regardless of treatment.23
offenders may have lost their inhibitions in acting out violent fantasies and point to
the possibility of the use of violent fantasy incidence as a secondary intervention
technique.
20. Prentky, supra note 19, at 887-91.
21. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON COMMUNITY PROTECTION, FINAL REPORT IV-4
(1989).
22. Lita Furbey et al., Sex Offender Recidivism A Review, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3,
22-27 (1989).
23. Critics of the Furby, Weinrott, and Blackshaw review, including the members
of the Governor's Task Force, object that the review did not include current studies
that have been properly designed; in addition, critics argue that the studies did not
employ appropriate treatment methods. The Task Force cites an article by Marshall
and Barbaree as demonstrating that "[a] recently reported follow-up study of a
behavioral treatment program for selected offenders found that treatment significantly
reduced recidivism." GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON COMMUNITY PROTECTION, FINAL
REPORT IV-7 (1989) (citing William Marshall et al., The Long Term Evaluation of a
Behavioral Treatment Program for Child Molesters, 26 BEHAV. RES. THERAPY 499, 499-
511 (1988)). But that article precedes the Furby, Weinrott and Blackshaw review by
one year, and also examines only one type of sex offender, child molesters, therefore
limiting the generalizability of the study findings. The strength of the Furby review is
that it examines studies of several types of sex offenders instead of just one type.
They caution that research "results from a sample representing one specific type of
[Vol. 15:809
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A more recent study, the Sex Offender Treatment and
Evaluation Project (SOTEP) of California, meets the criterion
of a properly designed treatment program that is not met by
many studies. SOTEP was acclaimed at a New York Academy
of Sciences international conference on sexual aggression as a
possible model for other states interested in implementing
treatment programs for sex offenders.24 Although less serious
offenders were admitted to the treatment program, after a
five-year follow up period comparing treated and untreated sex
offenders, recidivism rates were not significantly different.
The SOTEP project directors state that a significant reduction
in recidivism rates must be achieved to legitimate the costs
involved in maintaining the treatment program. The estimated
cost of a SOTEP reoffense is $211,000.5 The SOTEP analysis
concludes by recommending that the economic costs involved
in treating sex offenders be compared to the social costs of the
actual threat of violent crime to the general public.
Insofar as the criminological literature does provide some
guidance, the sexual predator legislation strikes us as unre-
sponsive to that guidance. In particular, we are puzzled by the
way in which the civil commitment provisions define predatory
crime as "acts directed towards strangers or individuals with
whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the
primary purpose of victimization."2 6 This would seem to
exclude family members and acquaintances although the data
indicate that "other known persons and fathers emerge as the
principal alleged offenders in sexual assault related incidents"
against the children of Washington.27 Stranger-related assaults
are reported as infrequent in number. In short, the definition
does not include family members, who have been demon-
strated to be the predominant offenders in child molestation
cases. 21 Of course, to include family members would have
offender will not necessarily be applicable to another specific type nor would they be
applicable to a population including multiple types." Id. at 4.
24. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT AND
EVALUATION PROJECT 6 (1989).
25. Id. at 38.
26. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020 (Supp. 1990-91).
27. GOVERNOR'S JUV. JUST. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ET AL., CRIMES AGAINST
CHILDREN: SPECIAL CHILD ABUSE REPORT 5 (1988).
28. This same point is made in another article cited by the Task Force. See
GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON COMMUNITY PROTECTION, FINAL REPORT IV-2 (1989)
(quoting Richard J. Gelles & Murray A. Straus, Is Violence Toward Children
Increasing?, 2 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 212 (1987)). Gelles and Straus underscore
the threat posed by parental abuse of childrn.n. It is perhaps also worth noting that the
1992]
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made the bill more intrusive and politically more controversial.
In criminological terms, however, it seems to follow that the
reach of the legislation should be extended to crimes within
families.
III. POLITICS
Victim advocacy groups played a pivotal role in the polit-
ical process that spawned the Community Protection Act.
Members of the groups "Friends of Diane" and "The Tennis
Shoe Brigade" actively lobbied for change in the state's crimi-
nal justice system. The Governor's Task Force on Community
Protection was created in response to public outrage over sev-
eral gruesome crimes committed by repeat sexual offenders.
Ida Ballasiotes and Helen Harlow, relatives of victims, became
symbols of, and spokespersons for, the activists' grievances and
were central members of the Task Force. The Task Force's
policy recommendations were responsive to victim and activist
testimony and to the emotions of the public.
Gary Nelson, chair of the Senate Law and Justice Commit-
tee, was quoted as saying that the sexual predator bill was "for
the victims of the crimes" and that it was a "tribute" to them.29
Indeed, public furor ensured that the bill never became an
object of legislative wheeling and dealing and that it went
through both houses virtually without opposition.3 0 The Task
Force recommendations were closely adhered to when the leg-
islators drew up their proposals. Marlin Appelwick, chair of
the House Judiciary Committee, acknowledges that some kind
of bill would have been passed given the public temper on the
Task Force cited this article in expressing its concern for the high levels of violence
against children, i.e., over 750,000 cases of parent-child abuse reported nationally each
year. The implication is that we have an increasingly urgent problem. Our reading of
the Gelles and Straus article and of the legislation leads us in a different direction. As
we see it, the principle points made by Gelles and Straus are that the level of violence
against children has actually remained relatively constant and that very severe types
of violence markedly decreased. Gelles & Straus, supra, at 217. Violence against
children only seems to be higher because of a large increase in official reports-that is,
an increase up to 10% per year beginning in the mid-1970s. Id. at 212. Their claim is,
however, that these reports are actually a function of the enhanced capacity of the
"community's social control apparatus." Id. at 214. As they see it, and most
criminologists would probably agree, the national victimization surveys on which they
draw provide a more accurate measure of actual abuse. Id.
29. Jim Simon, Senate Sends Sex Offender Bill to House, THE SEA7rLE TIMES, Jan.
25, 1990, at C6.
30. Jim Simon, Predator Bill: The "Victims' Lobby" Wins, THE SEATTLE TIMES,
Feb. 6, 1990, at Al.
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issue. He admits, however, that Ida Ballasiotes's and Helen
Harlow's perseverance made it difficult for legislators to reject
this particular bill. 1
Legislators involved in the political proceedings conceded
that public outrage about the crimes and the fact that the
accused were repeat offenders was a key factor in the passage
of the Community Protection Act. Even the ACLU, which dis-
approved of the civil commitment and mandatory registration
provisions because of concerns about their constitutionality,
kept their objections quiet. The state chapter of the ACLU
decided not to testify at the legislative hearings, concluding
that "it would be counterproductive, with emotions running so
high."32 Robert Stalker, the Task Force's civil liberties advo-
cate, also remained quiet, explaining that according to his"political assessment[,] . . . there was no point in opposing
this. , 33
The bill's authors were concerned more with lobbyists who
were agitating for even stronger measures than with argu-
ments about civil liberties. Indeed, the Task Force's sexual
predator recommendations turned out to be among the milder
proposals. The Senate, for example, passed a bill providing for
greatly reduced prison sentences for prisoners agreeing to cas-
tration. Legislators said they voted for the measure in
response to constituents' demands.' According to Paula Jal-
lison, administrative assistant to King County Prosecutor
Norm Maleng, "Lots of people were trying to make it tougher
• . . It was political suicide not to support [ . . . the sexual
predator legislation]. 35  Ida Ballasiotes and other activists
attended the House voting sessions. Ms. Ballasiotes was quoted
as saying "[w]e were watching to see if anyone opposed the
bill.... We were prepared to publicize the names of those who
voted against it." '36
The Community Protection Act was, in part, an offering to
the victim advocacy groups and to a concerned public. The
adopted provisions were directly responsive to the fears of the
average citizen and to the pain of victims and their families.
31. Id. at A5.
32. Barry Siegel, Locking Up Sexual Predators, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1990, at Al,
A30.
33. Id.
34. Id. at A31.
35. Siegel, supra note 32.
36. Id. at A31 (Note: Ms. Ballasiotes has denied making this statement).
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Activists such as Ida Ballasiotes and Helen Harlow seized the
initiative provided by public outrage and apparently over-
whelmed the political process.
Our preliminary research also indicates that the goals of
victim advocacy groups are not confined to this particular legis-
lation. Ida Ballasiotes has indicated that these organizations
have a broader agenda, which is aimed at Washington's entire
criminal justice system. Their long-term goals have not been
specified, except for Mrs. Ballasiotes's assertions that the pub-
lic thinks that the system as a whole "stinks" and that "the
parole board is next on our list."'  This determination to
encourage far-reaching reform reveals that the issues at stake
are broader than the Community Protection Act itself.
The prominent role of victim advocacy groups in the pas-
sage of this legislation raises interesting issues that are the
subject of some considerable controversy in the criminological
literature. There are those who see victim advocacy as a pro-
gressive force that can contribute to a healthy partnership
between criminal process professionals and the communities
that they serve.39 Others believe that victim advocacy groups
tend to stir up a kind of law and order populism that under-
mines civil liberties and diverts attention from the structural
causes of crime.4 ° We see our research as an opportunity to
shed some empirical light on what is so far a largely theoreti-
cal controversy. Among the questions that we want to pursue
are: To what extent was the influence of victim advocacy
groups typical or idiosyncratic? What forces account for the
political clout of these groups? We are also interested in learn-
ing more about the broader agenda of the victim advocacy
groups. What principles do they stand for and what kind of
criminal justice or other reforms do they favor?
37. We find it extraordinary, and meriting further attention, that so important a
piece of legislation could make it through the legislature virtually without opposition.
It is all the more surprising in that the civil commitment provisions can reasonably be
seen as a retreat from the legislature's unequivocal commitment to determinate
sentencing.
38. Simon, supra note 30, at Al.
39. See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1990).
40. See ROBERT ELIAS, THE POLITICS OF VICTIMIZATION: VICTIMS, VICTIMOLOGY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1986); John M. Johnson, Horror Stories and the Construction of
Child Abuse, in IMAGES OF ISSUES: TYPIFYING CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 5-19
(Joel Best ed., 1989).
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As Christopher Rideout's article demonstrates,41 the
Washington State Community Protection Act emerged out of a
clash of discordant voices. Victim advocacy groups burdened
by the raw pain of their losses demanded decisive action.
Criminologists and criminal process professionals, while not
unmindful of the agony of the victims, saw things differently.
To them, as Norval Morris's contribution reveals,42 civil com-
mitment programs have proven ineffective and abusive; indeed,
they are more likely to cause harm than to do good.
The Task Force was charged with the responsibility for
reconciling these discordant voices. It did so by introducing its
own voice. In narrowing the focus of the sexual predator pro-
visions to a discrete minority of the worst offenders, the Task
Force sought to avoid a complete retreat from the principles of
determinate sentencing. But in making an exception for a
rather loosely defined group of offenders, the statute intro-
duced the kinds of criminological inconsistencies that we have
noted.
All of this is not to suggest that the Task Force proposal
was a cynical exercise in least common denominator politics.
Problem solving, when undertaken with the seriousness of
purpose revealed here, is every bit as authentic as the outrage
of victim advocacy groups and the skepticism of experienced
professionals and criminologists. Indeed, responsible problem
solving is an obligation that we quite properly impose on our
political leaders.
Nor was the Task Force unmindful of the dangers of the
state overreaching itself. As we have already pointed out, and
as David Boerner's article makes clear,43 the criminological
inconsistencies in the legislation can be explained by the
efforts of the Task Force to confine the sexual predator provi-
sions to only the most egregious of the sexual offenders. The
initial reports on the legislation suggest that the statute has
been applied with moderation. According to the data
presented by Tim Blood in this volume,44 only a very small
41. J. Christopher Rideout, So What's in a Name? A Rhetorical Reading of
Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Act, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 781 (1992).
42. Norval Morris, Keynote Address, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 517 (1992).
43. David Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the Act and In the Word, 15 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 525 (1992).
44. Timothy Michael Blood, Proceedings Under Washington's New Statutory
Scheme Providing for the Indefinite Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent
Predators are Civil, not Criminal, in Nature, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 855 (1992).
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proportion of the eligible sexual offenders have been subjected
to civil commitment proceedings. This is consistent with other
research suggesting that the partial autonomy accorded to
criminal process professionals ordinarily buffers the system
from the more extreme demands made upon it.45
But the stakes of this legislation may be considerably
higher than criminological consistency or the incidence of sex-
ual violence. In the first place, the events leading up to the
Community Protection Act seem to provide a clear example of
what Albert Reiss has warned against: basing general policy
on the public's reaction to extreme crimes and thus "mask[ing]
the heterogeneity of events classed within them."46 The result
is to exaggerate the social costs of crime and to ignore its com-
plexity. Secondly, the civil commitment proceedings seem
illustrative of a growing tendency, explored at length by Stan-
ley Cohen,47 to erode the boundaries between the state and
society. In this instance, the heart of the problem is the way in
which the civil and criminal processes are fused by using civil
commitment proceedings to evade the constitutional con-
straints imposed on criminal process. Most notably, this legis-
lation can be seen as a step towards anticipatory social control:
the sexual predator provisions incarcerate individuals for fear
of what they might do in the future rather than for the crimes
they have committed and for which they have already paid
their prescribed debt to society. In short, irrespective of the
good intentions of responsible policy makers and criminal pro-
cess professionals, there are political forces at work that could
generate serious, unintended, and dangerous consequences.
45. See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF STREET CRIME (1991).
46. Albert J. Reiss, Public Safety: Marshalling Crime Statistics, 453 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 222, 225 (1981).
47. See generally STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL (1987).
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